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ABSTRACT 1
This article offers a new perspective on battling credit card fraud. It
departs from a focus on post factum liability, which characterizes
most legal scholarship and federal legislation on credit card fraud
and applies corrective mechanisms only after the damage is done.
Instead, this article focuses on preempting credit card fraud by
tackling the root causes of the problem: the built-in incentives that
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keep the credit card industry from fighting fraud on a system-wide
basis. This article examines how credit card companies and banks
have created a self-interested infrastructure that insulates them from
the liabilities and costs of credit card fraud. Contrary to widespread
belief, retailers, not card companies or banks, absorb much of the
loss caused by thieves who shop with stolen credit cards. Also,
credit card companies and banks earn fees from every credit card
transaction, including those that are fraudulent. In addressing these
problems, this article advocates broad reforms, including legislation
that would mandate data security standards for the industry,
empower multiple stakeholders to create the new standards, and offer
companies incentives to comply by capping bank fees for those that
are compliant, while deregulating fees for those that are not
compliant.
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INTRODUCTION
Credit card fraud, which is the use of another person’s credit card or
credit card information for the purpose of stealing, offers criminals one
of the fastest routes to riches today. The windfalls, which can reach into
the millions of dollars, 2 have attracted a broad spectrum of criminals,
ranging from foreign organized crime groups 3 to local street gangs, such
as the Los Angeles Crips. 4
The problem has reached epidemic proportions. Credit card fraud
exceeded $3.2 billion in 2007, 5 which is thirty-five percent higher than
in 2003. 6 One expert estimates that as many as “[h]alf of all credit card
numbers are in the hands of organized criminals” and that “[h]alf of all
computers have some form of malware on them,” 7 or malicious software
that infiltrates a computer program, records keystrokes, detects account
numbers and credit card data, and sends this data to the hacker without
the victim’s knowledge.
Credit card fraud can lead to identity theft, 8 the cooption of another
2. See, e.g., Randall Stross, Digital Domain $9 Here, 20 Cents There and a
Credit-Card Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2010, at BU3, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/22/business/22digi.html?_r=1&scp=5&sq=credit%20
card%20fraud&st=cse.
3. See JOSEPH MENN, FATAL SYSTEM ERROR: THE HUNT FOR THE NEW CRIME
LORDS WHO ARE BRINGING DOWN THE INTERNET 116 (2010) [hereinafter MENN, FATAL
SYSTEM ERROR].
4. See Joseph Menn, Gangs Get into Identity Theft, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at
C3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/12/business/fi-idtheft12.
5. Reed Richardson, Are You Compliant, SMALL BUSINESS ONLINE COMMUNITY
(Apr. 17, 2008, 8:41 AM), http://smallbusinessonlinecommunity.bankofamerica.com/
blogs/merchantServices/2008/04/17/are-you-compliant/.
6. Id.
7. Interview by Spencer Michels with Joseph Menn, Reporter, FIN. TIMES (PBS
broadcast, Aug. 12, 2010), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/science/julydec10/cyber_08-12.html (discussing “malware” and electronic theft of financial
information).
8. Although credit card fraud and identity theft are related, the two should be
distinguished. Credit card fraud is the unauthorized use of a credit card or credit card
information for the purpose of stealing. Identity theft involves using stolen personal
information, whether from a credit card account or other source, to impersonate
another’s identity. Identity thieves can use the stolen data to obtain new credit cards,
loans, or lines of credit to purchase goods and services under the victim’s name. See
generally Erin Fonté, Who Should Pay the Price for Identity Theft?, 54 FED. LAW. 24,
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individual’s personal information that is subsequently used to obtain
new credit cards or bank accounts in the victim’s name, costing the
victim time, money, and aggravation, as well as damaging his or her
credit history. 9 Credit card fraud can also take a major toll on
businesses. One study of 45 mid- to large-sized companies found that
cybercrime cost each of them an average of $3.8 million per year. 10
These figures do not include the staggering secondary costs of fraud,
which can include a loss in stock value, 11 litigation,12 and payment for
the reissuing of breached credit cards. 13
A. THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM
There has been an outpouring of creative ideas on how to curb
credit card fraud, including many ideas from legal scholars and federal
lawmakers. Few of these, however, focus on what we regard as the crux
of the problem: the incentives built into the credit card industry 14 to
merely contain credit card fraud at “comfortable” levels rather than to
attack it directly on a system-wide level. The credit card companies 15
26-27 (2007) (discussing various methods of identity theft). Identity theft fraud consists
of 4% of credit card fraud. See Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Counterfeiting and
Credit Card Fraud, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/count-contre/cccf-ccp-eng.htm (last
visited Aug. 15, 2010).
9. See Kevin M. Gatzlaff & Kathleen A. McCullough, The Effect of Data
Breaches on Shareholder Wealth, 13 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 61, 63 (2010); Anne
Borden, The Cost of Credit Card Fraud, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM (Apr. 29,
2007), http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/features/credit-card-fraud.html.
10. PONEMON INST., FIRST ANNUAL COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY: BENCHMARK
STUDY OF U.S. COMPANIES 2 (2010), available at http://www.arcsight.com/collateral/
whitepapers/Ponemon_Cost_of_Cyber_Crime_study_2010.pdf.
11. See Gatzlaff & McCullough, supra note 9, at 64, 67.
12. Id. at 61.
13. See Study Quantifies the Heavy Damage of Card Data Breaches,
DIGITALTRANSACTIONS.NET (June 4, 2010), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/
newsstory.cfm?newsid=2548 (stating that in 2009 it cost companies $252.7 million to
replace over 70 million in compromised cards).
14. The “credit card industry” in this article refers to the parties that play a role in
credit card transactions. These include the four major card companies, Visa,
MasterCard, American Express, and Discover, see id., as well as the banks that issue
and settle card transactions, the payment processors, and the merchants.
15. Although there are four major U.S. credit card companies, see
DIGITALTRANSACTIONS.NET, supra note 13, for the sake of simplicity, the discussion in
this article will often focus solely on Visa and MasterCard. This is because Visa
dominates the market by far, with MasterCard being the second largest company. As of
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and banks have engineered an infrastructure designed for their selfbenefit that insulates them from the true costs of credit card fraud,
thereby blunting their incentives to vehemently fight fraud.
Few people realize that retailers— not card companies or banks—
absorb much of the loss 16 caused by scammers who shop with stolen
credit cards. 17 The banks that issue credit cards may appear to pay for
fraud because they cover cardholders’ unauthorized expenses. In fact,
however, they pass many of these losses back to the retailer who sold the
goods to the criminal. Further, the card brands18 and banks collect fees
from every credit card transaction, regardless of whether it is fraudulent.
The card brands also collect fines from the merchants who are victims of
the scam. 19 The upshot is that the card brands, which set the security
standards for the industry, prefer to merely patch up their inherently
fraud-prone security system rather than push for the adoption of safer
payment technologies because that would require a greater investment.
Meanwhile, millions of American businesses are vulnerable and credit
card fraud continues to increase. 20
This article argues that the legal scholarship and federal laws
overlook this structural perspective. The article, which is divided into
five parts, advocates a new federal law that mandates data security
standards and strengthens the industry’s incentives to comply. Part I
surveys the legal literature and pertinent federal legislation and shows
how neither systematically addresses the crux of the problem. Part II
describes the mechanics of credit card transactions and how the industry
officially tackles fraud. Part III explains how the industry’s current
the end of 2009 in the U.S., there were about 270 million Visa credit cards, about 203
million MasterCard credit cards, 48.9 million American Express credit cards, and 54.4
million Discover credit cards. See Ben Woolsey & Matt Schulz, Credit Card Statistics,
Industry Facts, Debt Statistics, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/creditcard-industry-facts-personal-debt-statistics-1276.php. In terms of global market share,
Visa dominates, with MasterCard coming in second, and American Express a distant
third. Visa had 64.79% of the 2009 global market share in terms of volume of purchase
transactions. MasterCard had 26.5%; and American Express had 4.57%. See Nilson
Report, Largest Payment Card Issuers Worldwide (2010), http://www.nilsonreport.com/
largestissuers/index.htm.
16. The assumption underlying the use of the term “loss” in this article is that the
stolen goods will not be recovered, leaving someone else to pay for them.
17. See MENN, FATAL SYSTEM ERROR, supra note 3, at 115.
18. “Card brands” refer to the credit card companies.
19. See MENN, FATAL SYSTEM ERROR, supra note 3, at 115.
20. See infra Part III B.
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approach to data security falls short. Part IV explores the root causes for
which the credit card industry is reluctant to aggressively tackle fraud.
The article concludes with a wide-range of reform suggestions in Part V.

I. REFORM PROPOSALS SKIRT THE KEY ISSUE
ABOUT CREDIT CARD FRAUD
A. THE LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Although a plethora of law review articles have been written about
credit card fraud and the related area of identity theft, virtually none
consider the industry’s weak incentives to tackle fraud systematically.
Instead, most legal scholars focus on how difficult it is under current law
for victims of credit card fraud to win damages against companies
whose computer networks were breached. Federal laws, after all, rarely
give victims a private right of action against breached companies. 21
Courts have been loath to find breached companies negligent so long as
they did the minimum amount that is reasonable to secure data. 22 Judges
have been reluctant to give victims standing to force companies to be
compliant with industry-wide security policies. 23
Therefore, many legal scholars approach credit card fraud and
related identity theft reform with the idea of strengthening the ability of
victims to sue infiltrated companies. For example, De Amond urges the
adoption of common law or statutory torts to facilitate the ability of
Weaver
victims to sue breached companies for negligence. 24
recommends that states give consumers a private right of action to allow
them to directly sue infiltrated companies so that they would not have to
wait for the government to litigate on their behalf. 25 White proposes the
21. Federal courts have held, for example, that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(discussed later) does not provide a private right of action. See Dunmire v. Morgan
Stanley DW, Inc., 475 F.3d 956, 960 (2007); In re French, 401 B.R. 295, 310 (2009).
22. See, e.g., Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv., 2006 WL 288483 at *4-5 (D.
Minn. 2006) (holding a company that exercised reasonable care in handling personal
information did not breach its duty to its customers despite a breach that was caused by
one of its employees).
23. See e.g., In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D. Mass.
2007).
24. Elizabeth D. De Amond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 52-53
(2008).
25. Owen Weaver, Note, A Missed Opportunity to Bolster Consumer Protections in
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recognition of a “negligence per se” cause of action for identity theft
victims. 26 Schneider advocates allowing victims to sue breached
companies for “personal data exposure,” a newly recognized type of
injury, even if no tangible harm is realized. 27
Making it easier for victims to sue would undoubtedly help pressure
companies to take security more seriously. However, this approach
overlooks that many parties in the credit card industry can shift their
fraud losses to merchants and consumers, as discussed in Part IV. As a
result, making it easier for victims to litigate may not necessarily
translate into better security, at least not to the degree expected.
Other scholars approach credit card fraud and identity theft by
urging the adoption of specific anti-fraud technologies. 28 Technology
plays a central role in data security but, as criminal tactics continually
evolve, it is important that the incentives first change to encourage the
industry to select the best technological solutions for itself on a
continuing basis. Right now, although a plethora of technological
innovations exists, the banks and card companies appear more interested
in not “rocking the boat” than in pushing for the best options for all
parties. 29 The recommendations in Part V may help to change that.
Yet other scholars call on Congress to pass legislation that would
impose threshold requirements on handling confidential data 30 or that

Massachusetts: How Massachusetts Residents Are Still Without a Private Right of
Action After the TJX Security Breach, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 677, 700-03 (2009).
26. Anthony E. White, Comment, The Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action
for Victims of Identity Theft: Someone Stole My Identity, Now Who Is Going To Pay For
It?, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 847, 866 (2005) (arguing that the burden would then be placed
on financial institutions, which are best able to avoid liability, to prove otherwise).
27. Jacob W. Schneider, Note, Preventing Data Breaches: Alternative Approaches
to Deter Negligent Handling of Consumer Data, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 279, 291
(2009) (citing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 47-48
(3d ed. 2007)) (arguing that, although the idea of potential damages is rare, it is not
completely foreign to tort law). Schneider suggests that if a retailer is found to have
caused injury, damages awarded to the state should be used to compensate victims of
identity theft stemming from that incident. Id. at 292.
28. See, e.g., Ian Heller, Note, How the Internet Has Expanded the Threat of
Financial Identity Theft, And What Congress Can Do To Fix the Problem, 17 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 84, 106-08 (2007) (advocating biometrics as one of two proposed
alternatives to combat identity theft).
29. See infra Part III.
30. Amanda Draper, Comment, Identity Theft: Plugging the Massive Data Leaks
with a Stricter Nationwide Breach-Notification Law, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 681, 699
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would require corporations to draft privacy policies. 31 These are critical
first steps. However, threshold requirements need to be specific.
Privacy policies need to be compatible with other firms’ policies, as
security in the financial marketplace is interdependent: if the receiving
firm is secure but the sending firm is not, security is meaningless. As
importantly, any new law needs to offer companies tangible benefits to
become compliant with security requirements, as detailed in Part V.
B. FEDERAL LEGISLATION PERTINENT TO CREDIT CARD FRAUD
DOES NOT TACKLE THE REAL PROBLEM
Federal laws also fail to give the credit card industry strong enough
incentives to combat credit card fraud on a system-wide basis. Only a
few federal laws even require companies to preempt cyber crime. Most
pertinent laws tackle credit card fraud and related identity theft by
criminalizing these acts, thereby providing for the punishment of the
thieves after the fact, rather than requiring the prevention of data
breaches beforehand. For example, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
of 1986 (“CFAA”) establishes civil and criminal penalties for
unauthorized access to computerized data belonging to financial
The Cyber-Security
institutions or the federal government. 32
Enhancement Act of 2002 33 (“CSEA”) makes it a crime to hack into a
computer and enhances the criminal penalties already available under
the CFAA. 34 The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of
1998 (“ITADA”) criminalizes identity theft and provides for the FTC to
(2007). “The new law,” Draper writes, should “impose strict requirements on how
companies handle their confidential data, such as making it illegal to send out
information in the mail or online that contains a person’s Social Security number, not
allowing companies to share their personal customer data with their affiliates, or placing
tighter controls on the granting of credit.” Id.
31. See, e.g., Robert Sprague & Corey Ciochetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting
Personal Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 91, 130 (2009) (proposing a model statute that would require all
companies to draft privacy policies designed to protect personal information); Kenneth
M. Siegel, Comment, Protecting the Most Valuable Corporate Asset: Electronic Data,
Identity Theft, Personal Information, and the Role of Data Security in the Information
Age, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 779, 810 (2007) (suggesting that companies develop a
company-wide strategy to secure electronic information and that consumers, in turn,
need to take proactive measures to protect themselves from theft).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2005).
33. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 225, 116 Stat. 2135, 2156.
34. Id. § 225(g).
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establish procedures to receive complaints about it. 35
One goal of acts that criminalize and penalize credit card fraud and
identity theft, as in the CFAA, CSEA, and ITDA, is to deter would-be
criminals. However, political and practical limitations curb the
effectiveness of these laws. First, cybercrime is increasingly perpetrated
by foreign organized criminals whose governments refuse to extradite
these perpetrators. 36 Therefore, these criminals have little reason to fear
these laws. Second, in the United States, law enforcement has not been
able to keep up with credit card fraud, 37 thus reducing domestic thieves’
reasons to fear prosecution under these laws.
Congress also has passed a number of laws to protect consumers
from unauthorized credit card charges and losses tied to identity theft.
Thus, the Truth in Lending Act 38 (“TILA”), Regulation Z, 39 and the Fair
Credit Billing Act 40 (“FCBA”) limit consumer liability for unauthorized
charges to $50 in most cases. 41 The Identity Theft Enforcement and
Restitution Act of 2008 (“ITERA”) enables victims of identity theft to
seek restitution for money spent restoring their credit and fixing other
associated harms. 42 However, none of these laws helps to improve
security before the fact.
In fact, while these laws protect victims from some of the “frontend,” or direct, costs of fraud, consumers eventually pick up most of the

35.
36.
37.

18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2005).
See MENN, FATAL SYSTEM ERROR, supra note 3.
See Avivah Litan, Small Business Account Takeovers Have Regulators, Law
BLOG
(May
12,
2010),
Enforcers
on
the
Defense,
GARNTER
http://blogs.gartner.com/avivah-litan/2010/05/12/small-business-account-takeovershave-regulators-law-enforcers on-the-defense/.
38. The Truth in Lending Act is contained in Title I of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, as amended. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006). This was enacted in 1968 to
protect consumers by requiring the disclosure of key terms and costs in lending
transactions. See generally Matthew Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of
Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14
Cornell J. L. & Pub. Policy 199 (2005).
39. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1. Regulation Z was promulgated by The Federal Reserve
Board to implement TILA pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1607. It caps consumer liability for
credit card fraud to $50 in most cases. See generally Duncan B. Douglas, An
Examination of the Fraud Liability Shift in Consumer Card-based Payment Systems, 33
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 43-49 (2009).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).
41. See, e.g., id. § 1643 (a)(1)(B) (1980).
42. See Pub. L. No. 110-326, 122 Stat. 3560.
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tab at the “back-end” in the form of higher prices and other indirect
charges. TILA, Regulation Z, FCBA, and ITERA thus may leave
consumers with the false impression that someone else will clean up the
messes made by cyber thieves, thereby potentially dampening the public
will to battle the thieves.
The two laws that come closest to requiring corporations to tackle
credit card fraud preemptively are the Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act 43 (“FACTA”) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 44
(“GLBA”). FACTA requires merchants to truncate credit card numbers
to no more than five digits and refrain from including the expiration
dates on receipts. 45 While FACTA is important, it deals only with a tiny
part of merchants’ vulnerability to hacking. Much more is needed.
The GLBA requires financial institutions “to insure the security and
confidentiality of customer records and information” 46 and directs the
FTC, along with other government entities, to issue regulations ensuring
their protection. 47 The GLBA instructs financial institutions to develop
privacy policies and safeguards to protect data, including writing a data
security plan detailing the security procedures. 48 The plan must
designate at least one employee to manage it; build a comprehensive risk
management profile for every department in the institution that handles
private information; develop, monitor, and test the data security
program; and change the data protection plan as needed to comply with
how the data is stored. 49
While the GLBA seeks to tackle credit card fraud preemptively, it
offers few specifics. In fact, the GLBA’s entire security guidelines are
barely a page long. The law asks that firms have “reasonable measures
to protect data” 50 in place. It does not ask that their data be, in fact,
secure in any practical sense. The law does not require encryption,
passwords, or firewalls – all fairly rudimentary security precautions.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2003).
Id. § 6801 (2000).
Id. § 1681c (g)(1) (2005).
Id. § 6801(b)(1) (2000).
Id. § 6801(b)(1)-(3) (2000).
66 Fed. Reg. 8616, 8619-20 (2000). See also Fonté, supra note 8.
Id. at 8620-25 (2000). For the mandates, see 16 F.R. at 8620 – 8625. See also
Fonté, supra note 8.
50. See 16 C.F.R. § 314.4(b) (2002). This subsection is part of what are known as
the “Safeguard Rules” – regulations published by the FTC in 2002 to safeguard
customer information.
See Companies Comply to Safeguard Rules (2010),
http://www.identitytheft.com/article/companies_safeguard_rules.
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Moreover, it seems that firms may not necessarily need to take these
precautions to satisfy the law’s requirement of “reasonable measures.”
Consider the case of Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv., 51 where
the court did not find Brazos, a student loan provider, to have violated
the GLBA for allowing an employee to take a laptop home, which the
employee subsequently stole along with the unencrypted financial data
of 550,000 customers. The court held that, because the loan provider
had adequate written security policies, risk assessment reports, and other
safeguards, it complied with the GLBA. 52 It did not matter that the firm
allowed its employee to regularly download sensitive data on his laptop
to work on at home without encrypting the data. Though this might
strike many as a glaring red flag, the court held it was not reasonably
required by the GLBA. 53

II. THE MECHANICS OF THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY
To understand the structural incentives of the credit card industry, it
is important to grasp the mechanics of credit card transactions, their
points of vulnerability to fraud, and the way the industry tries to combat
these problems. This Part provides that foundation.
A. CREDIT CARD AUTHORIZATION AND SETTLEMENT
Two main series of transactions involve credit cards: authorization
and settlement. 54 During the process of authorization, a merchant
obtains “permission from the bank that issued the card to accept the card
for payment.” 55 Settlement is a multi-step process in which the
merchant’s own bank pays the authorized charge to the merchant and
the merchant recovers the charged amount from the authorizing, or
issuing, bank. 56 Although authorization and settlement practices vary

51.
52.
53.
54.

2006 WL 288483 (D. Minn. 2006).
Id. at * 4.
Id.
Ramon P. DeGennaro, Merchant Acquirers and Payment Card Processors: A
Look Inside the Black Box, 91 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV. 27, 32 (2006),
available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/erq106_degennaro.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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somewhat by card brand, 57 we describe herein those used for the two
most popular brands: Visa and MasterCard. 58
1. Authorization
The authorization process starts when a cardholder swipes his or
her credit card through a card reader at a merchant, say, Target. Let us
assume that the card is a Visa card issued by Bank of America. Target’s
card reader processes the information from the magnetic stripe,
including the card number, expiration date, and verification code. 59 The
card reader then electronically transmits the card information, together
with the dollar value of the transaction, to a “payment processor,” or a
company hired by retailers to handle their card transactions. 60 The
processor electronically forwards the information to the appropriate
Card Association member, as the industry often calls credit card
companies, here, Visa.
Visa identifies the “card issuing bank,” or “issuer,” here, Bank of
America, and electronically forwards the information to it for
authorization. Bank of America verifies the card information against
data it keeps on file and checks whether the cardholder has enough
credit to cover the purchase. The card issuer accordingly approves or
denies the transaction, and routes its decision back to Target through
Visa and the payment processor. 61
2. Settlement
The settlement process begins when Target electronically submits
the day’s credit card payments to its payment processor, who forwards
them to Target’s “acquiring bank,” sometimes referred to as the

57. DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE
DIGITAL EVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 9-12 (2d ed. 2005).
58. American Express and Discover work slightly differently. Id. at 12. We focus
here on Visa and MasterCard for the sake of simplicity.
59. For a discussion of the security code, see infra note 80.
60. Mark Hassinen et al., Emerging Trends in Information: An Open, PKI-Based
Mobile Payment System, 3995 LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCI. 86, 92 (2006). There
are about 10 U.S. payment processors. See First Data Thought Leadership & Rob
McMillon, Where Security Fits in the Payment Processing Chain (2010),
http://www.firstdata.com/downloads/thought-leadership/where_security_fits.pdf.
61. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 57, at 10.
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“acquirer” or “merchant bank.” The acquiring bank gives Target a line
of credit and agrees to immediately deposit the money due to it from its
daily credit card transactions to its bank account (minus various fees).
The acquiring bank essentially loans the money to Target until the
issuing bank pays the charge. The acquirer sorts and submits Target’s
credit card transactions to the appropriate Card Association members.
So for a transaction with a Bank of America-issued Visa card, the
acquirer submits that transaction to Bank of America, which records the
transaction in the cardholder’s account and pays the acquiring bank
(minus fees). The issuing bank later receives payment from the
cardholder, usually on a monthly basis. Although these processes seem
complex, ever since credit card processing became electronic in 2005,
they take mere seconds. 62
B. CREDIT CARD FRAUD – DISTINCTIONS AND MECHANICS
It is also important to grasp the mechanics of credit card fraud and
to distinguish between different types of fraud. One key distinction
considers how hackers steal data. The two most common ways are: (1)
manually, where the thieves retrieve data during the time that they are
infiltrating a computer, and (2) through a concealed automated program,
such as a virus or malware installed in the victim’s computer system.
These programs can “sniff” sensitive data and transmit it back to the
hacker until they are discovered, which can take months. 63 The latter is
more dangerous than the former because malware lies in wait to copy
data as it becomes available, such as when it is being transmitted. Thus,
malware can capture data even if the company does not store it. On the
other hand, old-fashioned manual hacking is less likely to be able to do
so because it is unlikely to infiltrate a system at the precise moment
when the data is being transmitted.
Once hackers have the information, they can easily copy it into a
62. Joseph Trigliari, How Credit Card Processing Works, available at
http://www.pivotalpayments.com/ca/industry-news/how-credit-card-processing-works800343615/.
63. WADE BAKER ET AL., VERIZON RISK TEAM, 2010 DATA BREACH
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 22 (2010), available at http://www.verizonbusiness.com/
resources/reports/rp_2010-data-breach-report_en_xg.pdf. Thieves used a sniffer to steal
data from over 45 million credit cards as the data was being transmitted from wireless
POS systems to TJ Maxx’s server. See Benjamin Ngugi et al., PCI Compliance:
Overcoming the Challenges, 3 INT’L J. INFO. SEC. & PRIVACY 54 (2009).

758

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

new magnetic stripe to create a counterfeit credit card 64 for use in stores,
in what are known as “card-present” transactions. Alternatively, they
may use the data to shop over the internet, phone, or mail, 65 in what are
known as “card-not-present” transactions. In the latter, the thief needs
to convince the store to ship to an address different from the victim’s
address to avoid alerting the victim, which many thieves have figured
out how to do. If the thief steals enough data, he or she may also
impersonate the victim’s identity and open new accounts in their name. 66
This raises another important distinction between types of credit
card fraud: stealing credit card data from a business’s computer network
versus using a stolen credit card to shop. The former may never result in
a loss if the breach is reported and the cards are blocked in time. The
latter, however, will result in a loss if the transaction is authorized.
C. THE RULES OF THE GAME: PCI STANDARDS
The credit card industry attempts to protect itself through security
standards called the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
(“PCI DSS”), informally referred to as “PCI standards,” “PCI rules,” or
simply “PCI.” The rules came about when, after years of retailer
confusion over different company-specific data security standards, the
world’s five largest credit card companies — Visa, MasterCard,
American Express, Discover, and Tokyo-based JCB Co. 67 — formed the
“PCI Security Council.” 68 In June 2006, they issued the standards. 69
64. Thirty seven percent of all funds stolen through credit cards are stolen with the
use of counterfeit cards. See Royal Canadian Mounted Police, supra note 8.
65. This kind of fraud is sometimes known as “existing” account fraud. Such fraud
consists of about 10% of credit card fraud. See Royal Canadian Mounted Police, supra
note 8.
66. C. M. Kahn & W. Roberds, Credit and Identity Theft, 55 J. MONETARY ECON.
251, 264 (2008).
67. Fonté, supra note 8, at 28.
68. See Ngugi et al., supra note 63, at 55. See also Richardson, supra note 5.
69. See Press Release, PCI Security Standards Council, Five Leading Payment
Brands Unite to Strengthen Global Data Security (Sept. 7, 2006), available at
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/09-07-06.pdf.
For standards, see PCI
Security Standards Council, The Prioritized Approach to Pursue PCI DSS Compliance,
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Prioritized_Approach_PCI_DSS_1_2.
pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). PCI-DSS was started by Visa and MasterCard.
Subsequently, the other credit card-issuing companies joined the effort. See John Winn
& Kevin Govern, Identity Theft: Risks and Challenges to Business of Data
Compromise, 28 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 49, 53-54 (2009).
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The standards apply to all companies that accept, store, or transmit
credit card data. They require basic measures, such as that firms erect
firewalls, encrypt data, keep cardholder data storage to a minimum, and
remove security codes from storage after a payment has been
authorized. 70
There is a validation process to make sure that companies are in
compliance with the PCI standards. The process is tiered, so that the
larger the company as measured by volume of yearly transactions, the
more rigorous the validation process. Visa categorizes companies into
four tiers, or “Levels.” As seen in Table 1, the vast majority of
companies (over 6 million) are Level 4 firms, which are small
businesses that process fewer than 20,000 online transactions or up to
one million store transactions a year.
Table 1
Tiered PCI Compliance Validation Requirements (Visa) 71
Level

Estimated #
of Firms

Number of Visa Transactions Per Year

1

326

over 6 million

2

709

1 million to 6 million

3

3,596

20,000 to 1 million e-commerce transactions

4

over 6
million

less than 20,000 e-commerce transactions and all firms
processing up to 1 million transactions a year

The requirement that companies comply with PCI is also embedded
in the contracts between the parties involved in authorization and
settlement. Instead of negotiating a separate agreement with each issuer,
each acquirer simply joins the relevant “card network,” an association of
banks that issue credit cards, 72 and “agrees to comply with its rules for

70. Other rules that companies must follow include using and regularly updating
antivirus software, developing and maintaining the security of the business’s systems,
and monitoring and analyzing access to secure systems to prevent unnecessary access to
information. See PCI Security, The Prioritized Approach, supra note 69.
71. Ngugi et al., supra note 63.
72. RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF
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all transactions on that network.” 73 The standard network contract
between the payment processor and merchant requires the merchant to
comply with PCI. 74 Since merchants do not contract directly with the
banks or card brands, but only with the payment processor, 75 the issuing
and acquiring banks embed their requirements of the merchants in the
processor/merchant contract, including PCI compliance.

III. PCI SECURITY RULES ARE BROKEN
A. INEFFECTIVE PCI RULES DESIGNED TO
PATCH UP A FLAWED TECHNOLOGY
The PCI security system is broken. The problem is that credit card
companies are wedded to a fraud-prone technology: credit cards with
magnetic stripes. This technology, which is about forty years old, 76
makes counterfeiting trivially easy. 77 Data on the magnetic stripe is not
encrypted. It can be read by the most rudimentary card-reading
machines. 78 Thieves can clone it onto another piece of plastic in a
matter of seconds, and use it for hundreds of transactions.
In the physical world, credit cards were supposed to be
authenticated by cardholders’ signatures. 79 However, the reality is that
signatures are easy to forge. Few cashiers have the training to identify
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS AROUND THE WORLD 20 (2006).
73. Id. at 21.
74. See, e.g., National Processing Company, Merchant Processing Agreement:
Terms and Conditions, at 7, available at http://images.paysimple.com/files/npc.pdf
[hereinafter NPC].
75. The card brands contract with the acquiring banks, who contract with the
payment processors, who contract with merchants, and who in turn contract with the
service providers. See David Navetta, Who is Minding the Legal Risk Around PCI?,
ISSA JOURNAL, 19 (2009).
76. See LEWIS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY 143 (1990).
77. Dave Whitelegg, Love it or Hate it, PCI DSS helps cut UK Card Fraud,
available at http://blog.itsecurityexpert.co.uk/2010/10/love-it-or-hate-it-pci-dss-helpscut-uk.html.
78. See Jay S. Albanese, Fraud: The Characteristic Crime of the Twenty-first
Century, in COMBATING PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT AND FRAUD 6 (Jay S.
Albanese ed., 2006).
79. See GPayments, An Introduction to Authentication (2001), available at
http://www.gpayments.com/pdfs/GPayments_Introduction_to_Authentication_Whitepa
per.pdf.
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bogus signatures. In addition, signatures are not even possible for online
purchases, which were probably never foreseen when the magnetic
stripe cards were devised. Yet, instead of investing in safer technologies
that depart from the magnetic stripe, the credit card companies built the
PCI security system around trying to secure magnetic stripe data.
Consider PCI’s key rule prohibiting companies from electronically
storing credit card security codes on the back of the cards. 80 The rule
assumes that, should hackers steal the magnetic stripe data, they would
not be able to use the card because they would not have the security
code. In fact, however, the three-digit security code is easy to figure
out. 81
Moreover, even if merchants try not to store security codes, they
may do so inadvertently. Most computers and point of sale systems
have numerous programs creating logs in different places that store
credit card track data. 82 Many merchants lack the sophistication to turn
off preferences for logging and storage. Even if those preferences are
turned off, certain computer operations are capable of triggering a
function that automatically reactivates logging for backup recovery and
security purposes. 83 Consequently, what are thought to be impregnable
80. See DeGennaro, supra note 54, at 40. As DeGennaro explains, credit card
companies “have long encoded a verification number into the magnetic stripe on the
back of the card. Visa calls this code the Card Verification Value (CVV or CVV1);
MasterCard’s term is the Card Validation Code (CVC or CVC1). This code, read
during the swipe, confirms that the card is actually present at the point of sale. The
problem is that this approach cannot help for Internet or MOTO transactions because
the card is not present and a swipe is impossible.” Id. PCI Requirement 3 requires
merchants to protect cardholder data. See PCI Security Standards Council, The
Prioritized Approach, supra note 69; NPC, supra note 74, at 7.
81. Three digits can be combined in just 1,000 ways. The difficulty of guessing a
password key depends on the number of possible combinations that can be formed with
the given password key length. This increases exponentially with increasing password
key size: (xn) where x is the number base (for example 2 for binary and 10 for decimal
numbers) and n is the password length. Thus, for a three-decimal digit credit card code
security, the number of combinations is 103 , which equals 1000. This would take
relatively little time to work out with a computer program - hence our assertion that “a
three digit code is easy to figure out. See M. Whitman & H. Mattord, Principles of
Information Security (2d ed.)(2005).
82. VeriSign, Lessons Learned: Top Reasons for PCI Audit Failure and How to
Avoid Them, at 4 (2006), available at http://www.verisign.com/static/
PCI_REASONS.pdf.
83. See Automated Event Log Management for PCI DSS Compliance, at 1 (2009),
available at http://www.gfi.com/whitepapers/automated-event-log-management-for-
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security codes may be easily compromised. The results from one audit
revealed that seventy-nine percent of companies do not adequately
safeguard sensitive cardholder data, including the security codes. 84
Another inadequate way in which PCI tries to shore up credit cards
is by merely requiring the encryption of cardholder data in “transmission
across open, public networks.” 85 In so doing, data stored on private
networks becomes susceptible to misappropriation by hackers and
malicious programs.
B. MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT OF PCI COMPLIANCE
1. Large Firms: PCI Compliant – But How Safe Are They?
By conducting independent assessments of firms, the card brands
have also attempted to enforce a compliance regime for PCI standards.
Level 1 firms undergo the most stringent review process, 86 whereas
Level 2 and 3 firms enjoy more latitude. 87 Curiously, Level 4 firms
escape scrutiny, thus raising serious security concerns. 88 From an
enforcement perspective, the card brands may also fine 89 noncompliant
and breached businesses and de-list 90 or strip them of the ability to
accept credit cards. Just as importantly, an acquirer may refuse to
process card payments, resulting in a business’s reputational damage for

pci-dss.pdf.
84. VeriSign, supra note 82, at 4.
85. The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard outlines twelve
requirements designed to improve payment account security, including the encryption
of cardholder data across otherwise vulnerable public networks. See PCI Security
Standards Council, The Prioritized Approach, supra note 69.
86. See Visa, Inc., Data Security Bulletin: Visa PCI DSS Compliance Validation
Framework 2-3 (Nov. 18, 2008), available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/
cisp-bulletin-visa-pci-dss-framework-111808.pdf.
87. See Ponemon Institute Report, PCI DSS Compliance Survey (Sept. 24, 2009),
available
at
http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/fckjail/generalcontent/18/file/
PCI%20DSS%20Survey%20Key%20Findings%20FINAL4.pdf.
88. See Joan Herbig, Level 4: The small merchant PCI challenge (Apr. 27, 2009),
available at http://www.greensheet.com/gs_online.php?story_id=1319.
89. See infra Part IV.
90. See ControlScan et al., What Small Merchants Know (and Don’t Know) about
PCI Compliance: A Research Report (2009), available at http://www.nrf.com/
modules.php?name=Documents&op=showlivedoc&sp_id=3511; see also DeGennaro,
supra note 54.
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failure to service clients. 91 PCI’s enforcement program has proven
resoundingly effective, as evidenced by the high compliance rates for
Level 1 and 2 firms (96% and 95%, respectively). 92
Despite the resources available to the card brands, it remains
unclear to what degree PCI compliance ensures reliable security. For
purposes of illustration, twenty-one percent of businesses validated as
PCI compliant during their most recent PCI assessments fell prey to
credit card fraud. 93 With one exception, the businesses from this sample
were grouped in the Level 1 category 94 (and, by definition, were the
subjects of comprehensive PCI assessments). For example, Heartland, a
large payment processor, was PCI compliant, but was the target of a
successful hacking attack. 95 More disturbing, Hannaford Brothers, a
large, reputable supermarket chain, was in the process of being
recertified as PCI compliant even as malware infected servers at each of
its approximately 300 stores, transmitting millions of credit card
numbers to thieves over a period of months. 96
2. Small Firms: The Weakest Link
PCI enforcement of Level 4 firms lacks definable parameters.
From a logistical standpoint, the PCI Council cannot monitor all Level 4
firms – that is, a total of approximately six million businesses. The
Council, therefore, requires that Level 4 firms complete individual selfassessment forms, 97 the contents of which are seldom meaningfully
challenged.
As a general proposition, though, the vast majority of Level 4
91. See Ellen Libenson, Dollars and Sense: Calculating PCI Noncompliance Costs,
E-COMMERCE TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, available at http://www.technewsworld.com/
story/60712.html.
92. Visa, Inc., U.S. PCI DSS Compliance Status (June 30, 2010),
http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/cisp_pcidss_compliancestats.pdf.
93. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 63, at 53.
94. Id.
95. Warwick Ashford, Heartland Data Breach Proves PCI Compliance Is Not
Enough, COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM, Jan. 26, 2009, http://www.computerweekly.com/
Articles/2009/01/28/234421/Heartland-data-breach-proves-PCI-compliance-is-notenough.htm.
96. Andrew Conry-Murray, Hundreds of Servers Compromised in Hannaford
Breach, INFORMATIONWEEK’S SEC. WEBLOG (Mar. 28, 2008, 3:44 PM),
http://www.informationweek.com/blog/main/archives/2008/03/hundreds_of_ser.html.
97. Visa, Data Security Bulletin, supra note 86.
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companies are noncompliant.98 Indeed, an alarming number of Level 4
merchants do not adhere to the most elementary of PCI rules, such as the
rule on encryption. 99 Despite this, Level 4 business’ compliance levels
continue to decrease. 100 The failure to remedy this situation is important
because Level 4 merchants collectively account for 99 percent of all
credit card transactions in the United States. 101 These firms unleash the
highest number of data breaches 102 and “are increasingly a larger
percentage of compromise incidents.” 103 One survey found them
responsible for 85 percent of all credit card breaches. 104
The problem is that credit card companies give small merchants no
incentive to be compliant. Since they rely solely on trust and do not
verify the merchants’ self assessment forms, credit card companies are
unlikely to fine or delist these merchants for noncompliance until after a
breach is discovered. At the same time, the credit card companies and
banks fail to reward Level 4 firms for compliance or subsidize their
expenses, even though research shows that most of these firms cannot
afford to comply with PCI. 105 Cost stands as “the main obstacle,” as one
study concluded. 106 Compliance can cost around $81,000 for a small

98. See, e.g., Mike Masin, The Cost of PCI Non-Compliance for Small Businesses
(Part 3 of 3), THE VIEW FROM UNDER THE HAT (Jan. 25, 2010),
http://m2.atstuff.com/the-cost-of-pci-non-compliance-for-small-businesses-part-3-of-3/.
See also PCI Compliance Fines For Small Business Breaches, BRAINTREE (Oct. 18,
2007), http://www.braintreepaymentsolutions.com/blog/pci-related-fines-for-breachesat-small-businesses (finding that, since 2005, over 80 % of card breaches have occurred
at small merchants).
99. Jaikumar Vijayan, Update: New Retail Data Breach May Have Affected
Millions of Hannaford Shoppers, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 17, 2008, 12:00 PM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9068999/Update_New_retail_data_breach_ma
y_have_affected_millions_of_Hannaford_shoppers.
100. PONEMON INST, supra note 10.
101. Masin, The Cost of PCI Non-Compliance, supra note 98.
102. See, e.g., id. See also BRAINTREE, supra note 98.
103. Mike Masin, Fraud Prevention for Small Business Owners, T H E V I E W
F R O M U N D E R T H E H A T ( Feb . 1 2 , 2 0 1 0 ), http://m2.atstuff.com/fraudprevention-for-small-business-owners/.
104. Kelly Jackson Higgins, National Retail Federation Poll: Small Retailers
Struggling To Understand PCI, DARKREADING.COM (Aug. 11, 2009, 3:46 PM),
http://www.darkreading.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=219200246.
105. Penelope N. Lazarou, Note and Comment, Small Businesses and Identity Theft:
Reallocating the Risk of Loss, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 305, 315 (2006); See also Masin,
The Cost of PCI Non-Compliance, supra note 98.
106. PONEMAN INST., supra note 10, at 1.
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business, though that number will vary depending on its precise size and
complexity, in addition to outlays to keep pace with security
developments. 107 For “‘mom and pop’ dry cleaners, pizza parlors, and
convenience stores,” that is too expensive. 108 Thus, many small
businesses decide to gamble, viewing the risk of hacking as “a simple
numbers game.” 109
3. Incoherence in Action:
Forcing Merchants to Jeopardize Their Security
Ironically, the acquiring banks, which require merchants to be PCI
compliant, 110 also essentially require them to jeopardize their security.
The banks embed in the merchant-processor contract a provision that the
merchants must store credit card data in their computers for one to two
years. 111
Storing sensitive data, however, turns merchants into magnets for
hackers – especially since PCI rules to protect stored data are so
inadequate. Merchants are told that they must provide the acquiring
bank with this stored data in the event of a “retrieval request” by the
Card Issuer, which occurs when a cardholder disputes a charge and
wants it reversed, when there is a point of sale error, or when there is a
fraud inquiry. 112 The banks and card brands, however, already keep
electronic copies of these same records. 113 Therefore, it is hard to
understand why they force businesses to store this sensitive data – other
than that it is convenient for them. It is easier to have the merchant
search for and produce a document rather than to do it themselves.
Ironically, however, it is not necessary to require merchants to store

107. See Pui-Wing Tam & Robin Sidel, Security-Software Industry’s Miniboom,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2007, at B3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB119128527341745878.html.
108. ControlScan et al., What Small Merchants Know, supra note 90, at 9.
109. Bob Sullivan, Instant Credit Means Instant Identity Theft, MSNBC.COM (May
25, 2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6762127/.
110. See discussion supra note 75 and accompanying text.
111. See NPC, supra note 74, at 16.
112. See id. at 11. See also Chase Bank, Handling Retrieval Requests, CHASE.COM,
https://www.chase.com/cm/crb/sbfs/page/request.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
113. The credit card companies and issuing banks keep copies of the data they
transmit during the authorization and settlement processes. See DeGennaro, supra note
54.
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credit card data for the sake of satisfying retrieval requests related to
disputes, errors, or investigations. While it may have been necessary
historically, when manual credit card punch machines were used 114 and a
merchant’s only record of a transaction was the paper duplicate, 115
today, the information is electronic, and can be used in that form to
settle the said retrieval requests.
4. Tokenization Could Solve the Problem of Unsafe Data Storage
for Retrieval Requests: But is it Used?
Moreover, merchants could satisfy the same retrieval requests
without storing any credit card data. With tokenization, the substitution
of the credit card number with a string of other numbers called a
token, 116 merchants store the token, not the credit card number or other
data on the card’s magnetic stripe. Rather, the payment processor or
bank keeps the credit card number and associated data in a secure server
or “vault,” and is able to map tokens to their corresponding credit card
numbers. The logic of tokenization is based on the premise that it is
easier to secure one central vault than multiple company networks. 117 In
the event of a retrieval request, the party that controls the vault would
get the cardholder credit card number and transaction details from the
cardholder or issuer, pass the matching token to the merchant and ask
for the electronic receipt. Production of the matching receipt by the
merchant would show the authenticity of the transaction. 118
In July 2010, Visa publicly agreed, in a nod to the National Retail

114. Sankarson Banerjee, Credit Card Security on the Net: Where is it Today?, 12 J.
FIN. TRANSFORMATION 21, 21-23 (2004).
115. Douglas Akers et al., Overview of Recent Developments, 17 FDIC BANKING
REV. 3, 23 (2005).
116. Avivah Litan & John Pescatore, Using Tokenization to Reduce PCI
(2009),
http://www.gartner.com/
Compliance
Requirements,
GARTNER.COM
DisplayDocument?doc_cd=169939&ref=g_fromdoc; Gary Palgon, Best Practices In
SOLUTIONS
ONLINE
(Apr.
21,
2010),
Data
Protection,
RETAIL
http://www.retailsolutionsonline.com/article.mvc/Best-Practices-In-Data-Protection0002.
117. See First Data & McMillon, supra note 60, at 3, 12-13.
118. See HEATHER MARK, SHIFT4 SECURE PAYMENT PROCESSING, STORING CREDIT
CARD DATA: A LOOK AT THE BUSINESS NEEDS, REGULATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
REGARDING THE ISSUE 7 (2006), http://www.shift4.com/pdf/s4-wp0801_storing-creditcard-data.pdf; First Data & McMillon, supra note 60, at 12.
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Federation’s long-standing complaints, 119 that merchants should not be
obligated to store credit card numbers for retrieval requests 120 and
indicated that acquiring banks should allow merchants to use
tokenization. 121 While this is a first step, it is hard not to wonder if it is
an empty magnanimous gesture. PCI is the organ through which
security changes are implemented in the industry. There is no
movement to reflect these changes there. Moreover, it does not seem
there will be any changes made any time soon: PCI is controlled by five
credit card companies, none of which has joined Visa’s statement.
The silence and lack of movement surrounding storage and
tokenization are telling, since tokenization requires a top-to-bottom
approach to work effectively. Those at the top must keep the credit card
data in a vault, while those at the bottom must keep the tokens. 122 As
one expert has stated, tokenization would “require the development and
implementation of a new payment processing protocol. All card
processors would need to certify with the card brands that they can
process the new payment systems, and all point-of-sale (POS) systems
would need to be both modified and certified for the new protocol.” 123
5. PCI Does Not Aggressively Push for New Security Technologies
that Change the Status Quo
The card companies’ passivity on tokenization is symptomatic of
119. See, e.g., Letter from David Hogan, Chief Information Officer, National Retail
Federation, to Bob Russo, PCI Security Standards Council, LLC (Oct. 2, 2007),
available at http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=News&op=viewlive&sp_id=380;
see also Marcia Savage, Visa: Banks Shouldn’t Force Merchants To Store Full Card
Data, SEARCHFINANCIALSECURITY.COM (July 15, 2010), http://searchfinancialsecurity.
techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid185_gci1516765,00.html.
120. Visa Inc., Visa Best Practices for Primary Account Number Storage and
Truncation (July 14, 2010), http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/PAN_truncation_
best_practices.pdf.
121. See Savage, supra note 119, at 1 (“Acquirers and issuers must allow merchants
to present ‘a truncated, disguised or masked card number on a transaction receipt’ for
dispute resolution . . . [since] the unnecessary storage of full Primary Account Numbers
(PANs) by merchants has led to data compromise, theft and unintentional disclosure . . .
.”).
122. Avivah Litan, Proposed PCI Changes Would Improve Merchant’s Data
Security, GARTNER.COM (Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.gartner.com/DisplayDocument
?doc_cd=152561.
123. Id.
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their overall approach to security. Although the technology sector is
highly innovative, 124 the card brands do not push hard for the industry to
adopt new solutions that would alter the status quo.
Take “chip and PIN” technology. 125 It replaces the magnetic stripe
on the credit card with a smartcard that has an embedded microchip.
The cardholder swipes his or her smart card and enters his or her
personal identification number (“PIN”). The use of a PIN makes
hacking harder because some of the information needed to conclude a
sale rests in the cardholder’s memory. Not all of it is on the card, as
with the traditional credit card. Furthermore, the data on the chip-card
remains useless until it is decrypted using the PIN.
Yet, chip and PIN technology has not made inroads either with PCI
or with card companies, 126 despite its proven track record in lowering
fraud. France, for instance, introduced a chip-based PIN system in 1993
and saw counterfeiting fall by 78 percent and fraud losses by 50 percent
in the first year. 127 By 1996, counterfeiting charges effectively had been
eliminated. By 1998, banks were saving about 0.1 percent of sales
volume on fraud. 128 In the United Kingdom (“UK”), the “success of
chipand PIN has meant that over the past four years losses on
transactions on the UK high street have reduced by 67% from £218.8m
in 2004 to £72.1m in 2009.” 129
PCS has also overlooked many other robust technologies. Take
end-to-end encryption (“E3”), in which cardholder data is encrypted
from the point of sale until it is received by the payment processor. E3
can reduce vulnerability to malware, particularly when combined with
tokenization. 130 New data-mining technologies also can help protect
124. See
e.g.,
Payment
Security
Solutions,
CYBERSOURCE.COM,
http://www.cybersource.com/products_and_services/payment_security/ (last visited
Nov. 18, 2010).
125. CHIP AND PIN, http://www.chipandpin.co.uk (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
126. See Claes Bell, Are Chip and PIN Credit Cards Coming?, FOX BUS. (Feb. 17,
2010), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2010/02/17/chip-pin-credit-cardscoming/.
127. Sushila Nair, Why the Adoption of Chip and PIN Technology is Inevitable,
SECURE THINKING (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.btsecurethinking.com/2009/12/why-theadoption-of-chip-and-pin-technology-is-inevitable/.
128. Id.
129. UK
Payments
Admin.,
Card
Fraud
Facts
and
Figures,
http://www.ukpayments.org.uk/resources_publications/key_facts_and_figures/card_frau
d_facts_and_figures/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
130. See First Data & McMillon, supra note 60. See also, Thomas Claburn, Credit

2011]

CREDIT CARD FRAUD: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
ON TACKLING AN INTRANSIGENT PROBLEM

769

merchants from online fraud by identifying and preventing criminals
trying to use stolen credit cards. 131
6. Leadership is Needed to Coordinate the Implementation of New
Technologies System-wide: Where is it?
Implementing new technologies requires leadership from the credit
card companies for a number of reasons. First, some technologies, such
as Chip and PIN, require broad implementation to work. It would be
pointless for a merchant to invest in PIN technology today since U.S.
payment systems do not support it. Broad implementation is best
coordinated from the top.
Second, system-wide coordination is often needed to ensure that
merchants who use the new technologies of a bank or payment processor
are not locked into a relationship with them. For example, imagine that
a payment processor offers to tokenize a merchant’s data gratis. The
merchant, enticed by the free offer, signs up. A year later, however, the
processor raises rates substantially. Unless the industry has a systemwide process for tokenization, the merchant would be stuck with the
initial processor. A new processor could not map or decipher the tokens
for lack of the original mapping file. The initial mapping tables belong
to the original processor. A uniform process might ensure that
merchants “own” their data, but the payment processor or bank would
hold it in trust for them so that when they move to a new institution, the
original institutions transfers it for them.

IV. CAUSES OF THE PROBLEM: WHY THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY
MAY NOT BE INTERESTED IN SEEING DATA SECURITY REFORM
The General Manager of the PCI Security Council recently
conceded that the Council is interested in fighting credit card fraud only

Card Processors Getting Encryption Religion, INFORMATIONWEEK (Nov. 21, 2009),
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/encryption/showArticle.jhtml?articleI
D=221900322.
131. See Show Me How It Works, THREATMETRIX, http://threatmetrix.com/oursolutions/show-me-how-it-works/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). PCI, however, focuses
only on protecting credit card data before it is stolen. It glosses over protecting
merchants against the use of credit card data that has already been stolen.
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if it can do so “within the existing system.” 132 Why this limitation?
This section of the article explores the financial incentives and the
historical background that lie at the root of this attitude.
A. FOLLOW THE MONEY: THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY’S LACK OF
INCENTIVES TO INITIATE FAR-RANGING ANTI-FRAUD REFORMS
1. Credit Card Companies’ Incentives
Overall, credit card companies do not have strong incentives to get
serious about fraud on an industry-wide, systemic basis. They get paid
every time their credit card is used, even in fraudulent transactions.
Their revenue mostly comes from “assessment fees,” a percentage of the
price of every purchase made using their card brand – 0.0925 percent for
Visa and 0.0950 percent for MasterCard and Discover. 133 The fee is not
returned in the event of fraud. They can also collect fines when
companies are breached. 134 This insulates the companies from the
immediate financial effects of credit card fraud.
Credit card companies may also have good reason to avoid trying
new technologies that could jeopardize their revenue. If “chip and PIN”
technology were used on credit cards, for example, card data might be
transmitted across existing networks used for PIN debit cards rather than
across credit card networks. If so, companies that operate PIN networks,
like NYCE and Star, 135 would profit, while credit card companies might
not profit.
This is not to say that credit card companies do not care about fraud
in the industry. They did, after all, establish PCI. However, it is likely
that their biggest concern regarding fraud in the industry is keeping it
132. Anton Chuvakin, RSA 2010 Exclusive PCI Security Standards Council
Interview, SECURITY WARRIOR BLOG (Mar. 12, 2010), http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/
2010/03/rsa-2010-exclusive-pci-security.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
133. See Electronic Exchange Systems, Merchant Credit Card Processing
Agreement (2009), available at http://www.oneclickdining.com/images/pdf/
MOTO_setup.pdf.
134. See Higgins, supra note 104. Card Association members can fine acquiring
banks between $5,000 to $100,000 per month for PCI compliance violations and
merchants and other players between $5,000 to $25,000 a month. Id.
135. Barbara Pacheco & Richard Sullivan, Interchange Fees in Credit and Debit
Card Markets: What Role for Public Authorities?, FED. RESERVE BANK KANSAS CITY
ECON. REV. 92 (2006), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/
PDF/1q06pach.pdf.
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from reaching such high levels that it would scare significant numbers of
customers from using cards because their profits depend on transaction
volume. It would probably take an enormous scandal before concerns of
fraud caused consumers to stop using credit cards, for several reasons.
First, credit cards are highly convenient. 136 Second, perceptions of
fraud levels, rather than real fraud levels, are what truly matter with
respect to frightening customers. In this regard, credit card companies
benefit from the fact that accurate measures of credit card fraud are
notoriously difficult to find. 137 It is suspected that credit card fraud is
vastly underreported. 138 Real figures are shrouded in secrecy. No
federal repository for data breach information exists. 139 State breach
notification laws are so riddled with loopholes as to make them virtually
useless. 140 PCI rules prohibit its investigators and assessors from
disclosing any information acquired in the line of service about
noncompliance or breaches. 141 Menn suggests that the card companies
and banks profit so much from the underreporting of fraud that they
“didn’t just keep quiet” about it, but also “actively worked to distort the
public discourse,” sponsoring, in one case, a seemingly objective report
that downplayed the severity of the problem. 142
In fact, lulling consumers into a sense of security about credit card
fraud has been an industry priority. One of the industry’s broadest
initiatives was implementing a “zero-liability policy,” 143 under which

136. Scott Schuh et al., Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payments?:
Theory and Calibrations, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Paper No. 10-3, 2010),
available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2010/ppdp1003.pdf.
137. Ben Ngugi et al., Evaluating the Quality and Usefulness of Information from
Current Data Breach Notification Systems (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with International Journal of Information Security and Privacy).
138. Identity Theft Laws – How the Legal System Can Protect You,
EMAILSCAMMERS.COM, http://www.emailscammers.com/identity-theft-laws-how-thelegal-system-can-protect-you/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
139. See Ngugi et al., supra note 137.
140. Id.
141. See PCI Securities Standards Council, Qualified Security Assessor (QSA)
Agreement, app. A, available at https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/
pci_qualified_security_assessor_qsa_agreement.pdf (stipulating in clause A.6.1 that the
QSA agreement contract requires total confidentiality).
142. See MENN, FATAL SYSTEM ERROR, supra note 3, at 116.
143. See, e.g., MasterCard Zero Liability, MASTERCARD.COM, available at
http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/cardholderservices/zeroliability.html
(last
visited Nov. 18, 2010); Visa Security Program: Zero Liability, VISA.COM, available at
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victimized consumers generally pay nothing for unauthorized charges,
less even than the $50 they would otherwise pay under TILA 144 and
Regulation Z. 145 As one expert noted:
It seems that all of the security improvements that the ‘credit card
industry’ (meaning the issuing banks and card brands) puts out there
are aimed at the consumer. . . . And that makes sense, because the
‘credit card industry’ wants consumers to trust their product and use
146
them as their preferred payment instrument.

Unfortunately, manipulating public perception of danger is much
easier than tackling the reality of criminals’ ability to hold the credit
card system hostage. As long as those perceptions continue and card
companies do not feel the financial repercussions of fraud, it would be
unreasonable to expect drastic change in their attitude towards security
on an industry-wide basis.
2. Issuing Banks’ Incentives
Most people think that the issuing bank bears the brunt of credit
card fraud losses, 147 for it is the issuing bank that consumers call when
they see unauthorized charges on their bills, and that seems to cover
those costs. 148 In reality, however, issuers shift much of the cost of
credit card fraud to the retailer who sold the goods to the thief. First, by
contract, issuing banks only absorb credit card losses when the thief
makes the purchase in person, known as “card present” transactions. 149
The retailer, however, takes the hit when the thief makes the purchase
http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/visa_security_program/zero_liability.html.
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (a)(1)(B) (2009).
145. 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(1) (2008); see also Duncan B. Douglass, An
Examination of the Fraud Liability Shift in Consumer Card-based Payment Systems, 33
ECON. PERSP. 43 (2009).
146. Robert McMillon, Helping the Merchant, SPEAKING OF SECURITY: THE
OFFICIAL RSA BLOG AND PODCAST (July 13, 2010), http://blogs.rsa.com/mcmillon/
helping-the-merchant/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
147. See MENN, FATAL SYSTEM ERROR, supra note 3, at 116.
148. Douglass, supra note 145, at 47.
149. See, e.g., Visa, Inc., Visa International Operating Regulations 881-88, 893-901
(2010), available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-internationaloperating-regulations-main.pdf; see also MasterCard Worldwide, Chargeback Guide
(2010), available at http://www.mastercard.com/us/merchant/pdf/TB_CB_Manual.pdf.
See generally, Douglass, supra note 145.
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over the phone, internet, or by mail, known as “card-not-present”
transactions. 150 Under this arrangement, merchants absorb about twice
as much loss as issuers, since online fraud is thought to cost twice as
much as in-person fraud. 151
Nevertheless, the issuing bank can charge back to the retailer all
fraudulent “card-present” sales in which the retailer failed to obey a
contractual requirement. Therefore, if the signature on the receipt does
not match the signature on the credit card, the issuer can charge the
retailer for the fraud on the grounds that he or she failed to verify the
signature, as required by contract. 152 Banks charge the merchants $25 to
$35 for every such “charge-back.” 153 Observers suggest that the number
of charge-backs is growing as issuing banks selectively choose 154 retail
transactions in a concerted industry effort to shift at least some of the
liability to retailers. 155
The second manner in which issuing banks can shift some of the
costs of fraud to merchants is through interchange fees. The less
competitive a market is, the more a business can increase prices without
losing market share. 156 The market for interchange fees is rather
uncompetitive. 157 The card brands set the interchange fees and the
150. MasterCard, Chargeback Guide, supra note 147, at 6-7. The merchant absorbs
the loss unless he or she “1) performed an address verification at the time the
transaction was authorized (that is, verified that the person conducting the transaction
could validate the billing address associated with the payment card being used); 2)
delivered the purchased merchandise to an address that matches the address validated
through the address verification; and 3) obtained proof that the purchased goods were
delivered to the verified address.” Douglass, supra note 145, at 45-6. See also NPC,
supra note 74, at 12.
151. KEN PATERSON, MERCATOR ADVISORY GRP., CREDIT CARD ISSUE FRAUD
MANAGEMENT (2008), http://www.sas.com/news/analysts/mercator_fraud_1208.pdf.
152. See, e.g., Visa International Operating Regulations, supra note 149, at 464; see
available
at
also
Fraud
Control
Basics:
Card-Present,
VISA.COM,
http://usa.visa.com/merchants/risk_management/card_present.html.
153. Robert Berner & Adrienne Carter, The Truth About Credit-Card Fraud,
BUSINESSWEEK (June 21, 2005), www.businessweek.com/technology/content/
jun2005/tc20050621_3238_tc024.htm.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See generally, Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among
Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549
(2002).
157. See Adam J. Levitin, Payment Wars: The Merchant-Bank Struggle for Control
of Payment Systems, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 425, 426-31 (2007).
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issuing banks agree to impose them. 158 There is no competition among
the banks to lure merchants to accept a particular credit card brand by
lowering the fees. In fact, with Visa and MasterCard controlling around
80 percent of volume of credit card transactions, 159 the card brands wield
such a large degree of market power that retailers have little choice but
to pay the fee. 160
The only competition regarding interchange fees comes from the
credit card companies themselves. They compete to have issuing banks
issue their brand of credit card by offering to set higher interchange fees
than their rivals. 161 This competition increases prices for merchants. 162
Indeed, American interchange fees, which are now between one to three
percent of the purchase price of each transaction, 163 have been rising
steadily since 2000 164 despite bitter protests from retailers. 165 The

158. Andrew Martin, The Card Game: How Visa, Using Card Fees, Dominates a
Market, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/01/05/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/05visa.html?_r=1.
159. See Maria Aspan, Visa, MasterCard Growth May Outweigh Regulations,
May 20,
2010,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/
REUTERS,
idUSN2022077920100520. See also Nilson Report, supra note 15 (explaining Visa
controlled 64.79% of the 2009 global market share in terms of volume of purchase
transactions, MasterCard controlled 26.5%, and American Express controlled 4.57%).
160. See Adam Levitin, Credit Card Fair Fee Act, CREDIT SLIPS, (Mar. 30, 2008,
7:51 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2008/03/credit-card-fai.html.
The
barriers to enter the credit card industry are high. Even if a new rival offered a lower
interchange rate, as long as customers preferred existing brands, the company could not
succeed. Indeed, no business has entered the market since Discover did in 1985. It
would be difficult to get customers because issuing banks, who pocket the interchange
fees, would want to go with the card brand that offered them the highest fee. Proprietary
cards, such as an Amazon.com card, are accepted only at a single retailer and do not
realistically substitute for general purpose cards such as a Visa card. Id.
161. See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 156.
162. See Martin, supra note 158. Vigorous competition by the card brands on
interchange fees has the unusual effect of raising prices for merchants, not lowering
them. Card companies vie for issuing banks’ business by offering higher interchange
fees and make their cards more appealing by offering higher interchange fees. The card
companies do not compete for merchants’ business. As a result, there is currently
upward pressure on interchange fees. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id.; see also Getahn Ward, Merchants Pay More to Accept Credit Cards, THE
TENNESSEAN, Apr. 8, 2010, available at http://www.tennessean.com/article/
20070408/BUSINESS01/704080362/Merchants-pay-more-to-accept-credit-cards
(“Most interchange costs come as a flat fee of 10 to 25 cents per transaction, plus a
percentage of the sale, about 2 % on average. Thus, a $100 purchase would include $2
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interchange fees charged are the highest in the world, 166 yet, as one court
found in 2001, “both Visa and MasterCard have raised prices and
restricted output without losing merchant customers.” 167 American
courts have not yet held that interchange fees violate antitrust laws. 168
Issuing banks can also slip the bill to consumers through higher
credit card and banking costs. Although the 2009 Credit Card
Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act of 2009 (“Credit
Card Act”) 169 plugged a number of revenue streams that the banks
enjoyed from credit cards, such as high over-draft fees, 170 plenty of

or slightly more in fees, which the credit card company shares with the bank that issued
its card and the bank that processes the purchase for the merchant.”).
165. See MANN, CHARGING AHEAD, supra note 72.
166. See Levitin, Payment Wars, supra note 157, at 462.
167. United States v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
168. See Steven Semeraro, Credit Card Interchange Fees: Three Decades of
Antitrust Uncertainty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941, 996 (2007). Not all uncompetitive
situations, however, meet the law’s definition. The Sherman Act does not, for example,
prevent monopoly status that is earned through good business decisions. See United
States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
Furthermore, some commentators feel that some of the past interchange fee antitrust
cases were wrongly decided and, therefore, are not truly dispositive. See, e.g., Levitin,
Credit Card Fair Fee Act, supra note 160. Indeed, antitrust litigation concerning
interchange fees remains very much alive. One case pending in the Eastern District of
New York consolidates forty actions against Visa and MasterCard. See In re Payment
Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 562 F.Supp. 2d 392 (E.D.N.Y.
2008). In addition, Europe has found interchange fees to violate its antitrust laws. The
European Commission’s antitrust authority ruled in 2008 that MasterCard’s interchange
fees were illegal. Press Release, European Commission for Competition Policy,
Commission Prohibits MasterCard’s Intra-EEA Multilateral Interchange Fees (Dec. 19,
2007),
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
SPEECH/07/832&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. In 2009,
the European Commission’s antitrust authority charged that Visa’s interchange fees
were also illegal. See EC Hits Visa Europe with Interchange Antitrust Charge,
FINEXTRA.COM (Apr. 6, 2009, 4:18 PM), http://www.finextra.com/news/
fullstory.aspx?newsitemid=19881; see also Press Release, Visa, Inc., Settlement on
Visa Debit Interchange Fees Aids SEPA (Apr. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.visaeurope.com/en/newsroom/news/articles/2010/visa_interchange_fees_ai
d_sepa.aspx; Matthew Dalton & Pepp Kiviniemi, EU Charges Visa Europe Over Fees,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2009, at C2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123902543327292827.html.
169. Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009).
170. 12 C.F.R. § 205.17 (2009).
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loopholes remain. 171 All this blunts the urgency that banks might
otherwise feel to initiate broad, system-wide anti-fraud strategies that
cover merchants and other stakeholders.
Issuing banks may also feel that they are doing enough to bring
fraud down to acceptable levels. Most use neural networks to track
individual cardholder purchases and spending habits. The network’s
ability to alert the bank to transactions that do not fit those habits 172 has
helped mitigate certain kinds of fraud, and may give the banks a sense
that they are doing enough. However, the technology is not failsafe. 173
Moreover, the banks’ adeptness at diverting their losses likely colors
their evaluation of what is enough to decrease fraud.
3. Acquiring Banks’ Incentives
Some people think that if the merchant is hacked, the acquiring
bank pays for the damages, including fines. 174 Visa publicly reports that
it fines acquiring banks hundreds of millions of dollars a year for their
merchants who are breached while not compliant with PCI. 175 However,
card brands fine the acquiring banks when the merchant has been hacked
because the credit card company’s contract is with the acquiring bank,
not the merchant. 176
However, it is less well known that acquiring banks are
contractually entitled to indemnification by merchants for any losses
they incur as a result of the breach, including fines. 177 Acquiring banks
deduct the amount of the fine and any other losses it incurred from the
merchant’s bank account.
Acquiring banks also can offset fraud losses indirectly through the
171. Jaclyn Rodriguez, The Credit Card Act of 2009: An Effective But Incomplete
Solution Evidencing the Need for a Federal Regulator, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 309, 328
(2010).
172. Craig Bicknell, EFalcon Preys on Credit Card Fraud, WIRED (May 13, 1999),
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/1999/05/19662.
173. See Jay MacDonald, Fraud, Identity Theft, Grow at ATMs,
CARDSWITCHTECHNOLOGY.COM (Jul. 17, 2008), http://www.cardswitchtechnology.com/
Documents/News3.pdf.
174. See, e.g., Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Symposium: Security
Breach Notification Six Years Later: Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection:
Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1077 n.80 (2009).
175. Id. at 1077 n.81-84.
176. See Navetta, supra note 75, and related discussion.
177. See NPC, supra note 74, at 6.
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discount fees they charge retailers, which is now 0.07 percent per
transaction. 178 All this would weaken acquiring banks’ incentives to
effect broad-based changes.
B. FOLLOW THE HISTORY:
WHY THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS DATA SECURITY IS SO INSULAR
The historical roots of the two largest card brands, Visa and
MasterCard, provide another way to understand why the card brands and
banks seem so self-interested in their approach to security. From the
1960s, when they came into being, and until recently, the main card
brands were structured as not-for-profit membership associations owned
by issuing and acquiring banks. 179 In contrast to regular stock
corporations, in which shareholders tend not to have direct outside
business relationships with the firm, a membership association’s
members do business with and are involved in running the association.
Each member received a certain number of votes to influence how the
association was run. 180 The higher a member’s yearly volume of
Members selected the
transactions, the more votes it held. 181
Association’s Board of Directors, which was almost always drawn from
the senior management at the largest member banks. 182
Although Visa 183 and MasterCard 184 recently went public, becoming
shareholder-owned companies, experts note that the reorganizations
have not fundamentally changed the way they operate. 185 One scholar
observed, MasterCard’s and Visa’s “post-IPO capital structure is
designed to permit banks to retain effective control over the company
without holding a majority of shares and giving a veneer of
independence to decisions. . . .” 186
178.
179.

See Martin, supra note 158; see also Pacheco & Sullivan, supra note 135.
See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 57, at 63. The banks agreed to
cooperate on setting operational standards, but to compete for merchants and
cardholders. Id.
180. Id. at 162.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Katie Benner, Visa IPO Prices at Record $17.9, CNN MONEY (Mar. 18, 2008),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/18/news/companies/visa_ipo.fortune/index.htm.
184. Tess Vigeland, MasterCard IPO, MARKETPLACE PUBLIC RADIO, May 3, 2006,
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/05/03/mastercard_ipo/.
185. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 57, at 162.
186. Levitin, Credit Card Fair Fee Act, supra note 160.
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Thus, the system, while not completely ignoring merchant and
consumer interests, 187 tilts in favor of the banks and credit card
companies because it was designed for them. 188 They can continue in
that tradition today because they control the industry’s infrastructure.
They control PCI, hand down its rules, enforce them, impose fines,
decide who to de-list, fix fees charged to merchants, and decide whether
to impose higher PCI standards on breached companies. They
essentially play the role of prosecutor, judge, and jury. Barring
litigation, their decisions are final.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Stemming credit card fraud requires federal intervention. The
credit card companies and banks have weak incentives to crush the
ability of criminals to infiltrate not just banks, but also merchants, large
and small. The current go-it-alone approach may help secure an
individual company or a defined group. Ultimately, however, it drives
fraud to other, less protected businesses, since cyber criminals look “for
easy pickings.” 189 Therefore, we propose the enactment of a new federal
law to direct the process of creating security standards that would tackle
credit card fraud across the card industry.
A. MAKE SECURITY STANDARDS MANDATORY
We propose making security standards mandatory for all
companies, regardless of size or type, that are involved in credit card
transactions. Following the European Union model of having a public
authority oversee the development of security rules and settle
disputes, 190 we propose the appointment of a Data Security
Commissioner (“Commissioner”) to oversee the enactment of new

187.
188.
189.

Id.
See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 57, at 163.
Zafar: Banks Need to Outsmart Criminals, EURACTIV.COM (Jan. 31, 2010),
http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/zafar-banks-need-outsmart-criminals
(last visited Aug. 16, 2010); see also, Gary Palgon, Best Practices In Data Protection
http://communications.
(April
21,
2010),
RETAILSOLUTIONSONLINE.COM,
retailsolutionsonline.com/article.mvc/Best-Practices-In-Data-Protection-0004
(describing cyber criminals as opportunists).
190. Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 28, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 47, 48.
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security standards.
B. LET STAKEHOLDERS DRAWN FROM THE INDUSTRY
DESIGN THE SECURITY STANDARDS
The industry should design the security standards, as it is best
situated to know its needs. However, to establish incentives to design
the best system for all, on an industry-wide basis, the process should
include all stakeholders, including merchants. Including all stakeholders
is key to redressing the skewed incentives inherent in the industry’s
current lopsided power structure.
Therefore, we propose that a new Data Security Council
(“Council”) create industry standards and replace the one-sided PCI
Executive Council. The new Council’s membership would be drawn
from groups across the industry: merchants of all sizes and sectors,
payment processors, experts in security technologies, as well as banks
and credit card companies. The associations representing the various
parties, such as the American Bankers’ Association and the National
Federation of Retailers, would determine who should represent them on
the Council. Our proposed Commissioner should also be a member of
the Council.
This structure would allow for a representation of the industry’s
multi-faceted perspectives on security. Proposals for such multistakeholder dialogue have appeared in recent years. Examples include
the United Nations Global Compact and the European Multi-Stakeholder
Forum on Corporation Social Responsibility, “which propose dialogue
among the different agents involved as a working methodology aimed at
making headway in multilateral consensus proposals.” 191
C. LET THE COUNCIL GATHER INFORMATION
The Commissioner, in his or her position as a member of the
Council, should have the power to compel companies to supply
information about the type, extent, and costs of credit card fraud and
related issues. 192 That information should be shared with the Council.
191. Laura Albareda et al., Public Policies on Corporate Social Responsibility: The
Role of Governments in Europe, 74 J. BUS. ETHICS 391, 393 (2007).
192. This power follows a recommendation in the Durbin Amendment asking the
Federal Reserve Bank to consider certain factors when drafting anti-fraud regulations
related to debit cards. Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203

780

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

Appropriate information should be made public. Lack of accurate
information about fraud undoubtedly contributed to the inertia about
security in the industry. Raising awareness of the magnitude of fraud
will help sustain the pressure for reform.
D. CUT INTERCHANGE FEES FOR COMPLIANT COMPANIES;
DON’T FOR NONCOMPLIANT ONES
Security costs money. The smaller the company, the bigger the
burden. Since the credit card companies own the card technology and
they and the banks operate the networks, they would contribute the
major investment in implementing standards. Small merchants would
probably have to buy point of sale (“POS”) machines to read whatever
new cards the Council may propose.
Larger merchants might
additionally need to buy new software and hardware and integrate their
networks with the new technology.
We propose giving merchants incentives to comply. For those
merchants who are fully compliant with the new standards, the
Commissioner would cap the interchange rate at a substantial discount
of its current rate. For non-compliant merchants, interchange rates
would be deregulated, with the banks and credit card companies free to
charge what they wish. The goal would be to have a significant
difference between the interchange rates for complaint and noncompliant firms. This would give merchants an immediate major
financial benefit to becoming compliant. At the same time, investing in
better security would lower merchants’ own losses to fraud over the
long-term.
Under this proposal, the banks and card companies would indirectly
subsidize merchant compliance, since they would be receiving lower
fees from compliant companies. However, this would be justified
because they presumably would have less fraud to deal with as
merchants become more secure.
The difference in interchange rates could also spawn entrepreneurs
willing to lease POS systems to merchants for a fraction of the money
they would save on interchange fees when becoming secure, making
compliance even more affordable for certain retailers.

§§ 1075(a)(5)(B)(ii)(I)-(V), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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E. MAKE LYING ABOUT SECURITY COMPLIANCE A FELONY
The law would make it a felony for merchants to lie about whether
they are security compliant and subject them to fines if they lie. Today,
the consequences of lying about PCI compliance stand unclear. The
new law needs to make them clear.
F. REDUCE THE ABILITY TO SHIFT FRAUD LOSSES DOWNSTREAM
The banks’ use of loopholes in the wake of the Credit Card Act of
2009 suggests 193 that it would be difficult to reduce banks’ ability to
shift losses. However, their ability to shift losses is problematic only if
the banks are the only entities responsible for setting the industry’s
security standards – because it weakens their desire to secure the system
for all. However, under the new law, a Council represented by multiple
stakeholders and overseen by a public Commissioner would set industry
security standards. The standards would be mandatory and penalties
would follow noncompliance.
It is time for the private sector, with the help of the public sector, to
reconsider how to make our payment system safe from top to bottom.
We hope that some of the suggestions herein might help move the
system in that direction.

193.

See Rodriguez, supra note 171, at 324-8.

